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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GEORGE CANTRES, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8862 
CITY EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 237. 
Respondent. 
CARLOS A. FERREIRA. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
FISHER & FISHER. ESQS. (MICHAEL J. VOLLBRECHT. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
Employees Union Local 237 (Local 237) from an Administrative 
Law Judge's (ALJ) decision which found it to have violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act), by failing to represent properly George Cantres, 
Charging Party, in connection with certain disciplinary 
proceedings brought against him by his employer, the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District). The ALJ found that Local 237 breached its duty 
of fair representation to the Charging Party when it failed 
to communicate adequately with him and failed to investigate 
adequately his disciplinary case at the first step of the 
grievance procedure, when it failed to properly present and 
pursue the grievance at subsequent step(s) of the grievance 
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procedure, and when it excluded Charging Party from a Step II 
hearing following his statement that he was going to retain an 
attorney. The ALJ found that as a result of the failure of 
Local 237 to process properly his disciplinary grievance. 
Charging Party was terminated by the District without having 
had an opportunity to present witnesses in his own behalf. 
The ALJ directed that Local 237 promptly seek to reopen 
Charging Party's disciplinary case and have a hearing 
scheduled, and that it promptly notify Charging Party that, if 
he wishes, it will represent him at such hearing. Local 237 
excepts to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order 
of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Charging Party, a school safety officer employed by the 
District, was reassigned, on or about April 21, 1986, from his 
usual work location, Brandeis High School, to the District's 
borough office pending an investigation of certain allegations 
of misconduct on his part involving female students, which 
allegedly occurred on April 18. Between April 21 and May 6, 
1986, when Charging Party was suspended without pay, he made 
numerous attempts to reach his local representative, Lundy, by 
telephone and through his shop steward. All of these attempts 
were unsuccessful. Following his suspension. Charging Party 
made numerous additional attempts to reach his local 
representative by telephone, all of which were unsuccessful. . 
On May 20 or 21, 1986. Charging Party visited Local 237's 
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office and saw Lundy. Lundy indicated that she was not 
prepared to discuss the charges until a copy of the written 
charges was received from the District. On May 22, Charging 
Party received a copy of the charges against him, which 
alleged that he "violated the Rules and Procedures of the 
Office of School Safety by engaging in undue fraternization 
with students at Brandeis H.S.," and that he "used abusive 
language towards female students." According to the notice of 
charges, a Step I hearing was to be held on May 29, 1986, at 
10:00 a.m. Between May 22 and May 29. Charging Party 
attempted to reach Lundy by telephone, to discuss the charges 
and prepare for the hearing, but was unable to reach her. and 
received no answering call. 
According to Charging Party's testimony. Lundy arrived at 
the May 29 hearing approximately fifteen minutes late and 
informed Charging Party that there was no time prior to the 
hearing to discuss the case. At the hearing, Lundy 
cross-examined the District's sole witness, a student at 
Brandeis High School. Also at the hearing. Charging Party 
provided to Lundy six written statements he had collected from 
teachers and others at the high school on or before May 6, 
when he was suspended. Two persons provided general positive 
work references, and the other four asserted that Charging 
Party was in attendance at a basketball game at the high 
school on the afternoon that Charging Party was informed that 
an incident involving female students at the high school had 
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occurred. Lundy placed these statements in the record, but 
made no attempt to call any of the persons who had provided 
statements, or others whose names were suggested by Charging 
Party as witnesses. 
On June 6 or 7. Charging Party called the District and 
was informed that he had been terminated. He contacted Lundy, 
but was unable to reach her and- his call was not returned. 
Thereafter, he received a letter, dated June 11. 1986. from 
Illery, assistant director of the city-wide division of Local 
237, stating that Local 237 had determined that "there are no 
merits in your case that would have any value for a Step III 
Appeal Review." 
Thereafter, at Charging Party's request. Local 237 
reconsidered its decision not to pursue his grievance further, 
and ultimately, on July 1. 1986, a Step II hearing was 
scheduled. Illery was to handle the hearing at that stage 
and, prior thereto, conducted an investigation of Charging 
Party's case by interviewing the persons who had written the 
statements in support of Charging Party, as well as some other 
individuals, and by reviewing some reports and statements 
obtained from the District by Lundy. Illery requested three 
individuals to testify on behalf of Charging Party at the July 
1 hearing, but learned, either before or at the time of the 
hearing, that they would not. for various reasons, be 
appearing to testify. When Charging Party met with Illery 
outside the hearing room on July 1, he learned for the first 
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time that witnesses would not be called on his behalf. He 
requested a postponement so that witnesses could be brought in 
to testify on his behalf. When Illery refused to request a 
postponement (stating that they should go into the hearing and 
find out "what the District had"). Charging Party asked. "What 
if I get an attorney?". Illery responded that Local 237 would 
remove itself from the case if Charging Party opted to be 
represented by an attorney and Charging Party, after some 
hesitation, decided he wanted to proceed with his own 
attorney. Illery then went into the hearing room without 
Charging Party to conduct the Step II hearing on behalf of 
another employee, Edwards. Because the hearing room door 
locked behind Illery, Charging Party was excluded from the 
hearing room. Thereafter, the Step II appeal was denied by 
the District and no further appeal was filed or attempted to 
be filed, either by Charging Party or Local 237. to Step III 
of the grievance procedure.— 
According to the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement between Local 237 and the District, an employee is 
entitled to be represented by Local 237 or a unit member, but 
there is no authorization for an employee to be represented by 
an attorney at least at the first two steps of the 
i^There is no record evidence, and it is not alleged, 
that Local 237 improperly failed or refused to process the 
grievance to the third step or that there was even a 
request by the Charging Party or his attorney to do so. 
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disciplinary grievance procedure. There is no apparent bar to 
attorney representation at the third and fourth steps of the 
procedure. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well settled that a bargaining agent has a duty 
under the Act to perform its representative function without 
2 / improper motivation, gross negligence or irresponsibility.— 
In essence. Charging Party alleges that Local 237 acted in a 
grossly negligent or irresponsible manner in its handling of 
his disciplinary case. 
The preponderance of Charging Party's allegations relate 
to the handling of his disciplinary matter by Lundy at and 
before the first step of the disciplinary grievance 
procedure. Charging Party's testimony, which was unrefuted 
since Lundy did not appear to testify, was that he placed 
numerous telephone calls to Lundy in an effort to provide her 
with information about his case and witnesses' statements, and 
to obtain information from her. Although it appears that 
Lundy did in fact perform some investigatory work on the 
i/Brighton Transportation Association. 10 PERB 1[3090 
(1977); Nassau Educational Chapter of the Syosset CSD Unit. 
CSEA. Inc.. 11 PERB 1P010 (1978). 
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case, since the file delivered to Illery in preparation for 
the second step hearing contained a number of reports and 
statements collected by Lundy. Charging Party's unrefuted 
testimony with reference to Lundy was properly given greater 
weight by the ALJ. Thus, it appears that Lundy's handling of 
Charging Party's disciplinary case, prior to and at the Step I 
hearing, constitutes gross negligence by reason of her failure 
to communicate with him, failure to communicate with potential 
witnesses, and failure otherwise to prepare for the hearing, 
and we affirm the decision of the ALJ in this regard. 
In his amended charge. Charging Party also asserted that 
Local 237 breached its duty of fair representation in two 
respects at the second step hearing conducted on July 1, 
1986. He alleged first that Illery1s handling of his case was 
improper due to the existence of an inherent conflict of 
interest, in that Illery's daughter had assisted in the 
investigation which gave rise to the disciplinary charges 
against him. The ALJ found, and we agree, that the existence 
of this relationship, without specific evidence of bias or 
impropriety, is insufficient to support any finding of bad 
faith or other wrongdoing. 
The second allegation made by Charging Party concerning 
Local 237's handling of his case at the second step is that 
Illery improperly refused to reguest a postponement of the 
hearing in order to obtain the presence of witnesses 
"11104 
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unavailable on July 1. While we accept as fact Illery's 
assertion that the Step II appeal hearing is not intended to 
constitute an evidentiary hearing, it is clear that there is 
no prohibition against calling witnesses. Illery. in fact, 
made diligent efforts to produce witnesses for the second step 
hearing, requesting their presence and making follow-up calls 
to ascertain their whereabouts on the day of the hearing. In 
view of the fact that no witnesses at all were called on 
behalf of Charging Party at the first step hearing. Local 
237's responsibility to present evidence on behalf of Charging 
Party at Step II increased. Despite this increased 
responsibility, we do not find that the failure to produce 
witnesses at the Step II hearing constituted a per se breach 
of the duty of fair representation. Similarly, we also do not 
find improper the refusal to request a postponement of the 
hearing to obtain witnesses. A union is entitled to wide 
latitude in evaluating a case and determining how it should be 
presented, and there is no evidence that Illery's judgment in 
this regard amounted to gross negligence or irresponsibility. 
Illery's stated intentions of wanting to proceed quickly with 
the Step II hearing in view of the suspension of the affected 
employees, including Charging Party, and wanting to "see what 
the District had", presumably in preparation for a full 
evidentiary hearing at the third or fourth step of the 
grievance procedure, were well within his discretion. We 
accordingly also affirm the portion of the ALJ decision which 
11105 
Board - U-8862 
-9 
dismissed the charge that Local 237 violated §209-a.2(a) of 
the Act when it failed to request a postponement of the Step 
II hearing for the purpose of obtaining witnesses. 
The ALJ's finding that Local 237 violated the Act at the 
Step II hearing was based upon testimony adduced at the 
hearing that Charging Party was excluded from the hearing room 
by Illery, following Charging Party's decision to retain an 
attorney to represent him, and that Local 237 abandoned the 
processing of Charging Party's case by failing to seek an 
adjournment so that an orderly transfer of the matter to 
counsel could occur. In so finding, the ALJ concluded that 
Illery indicated to Charging Party that he could come into the 
hearing room if he wanted Local 237 representation but. if he 
wanted attorney representation, he could not enter the hearing 
room. In reviewing the record of this case, we perceive the 
testimony somewhat differently. In essence, Illery informed 
Charging Party that the hearing would proceed on that day if 
he wished to have Local 237 represent him, but if he wanted to 
retain private counsel, the hearing would not proceed. It 
would, therefore, not be necessary for him to appear in the 
hearing room. In view of Charging Party's decision to retain 
counsel, a decision which he was entitled to make, no hearing 
was conducted on his behalf on July 1. and the only hearing 
which was conducted was the hearing for another employee. 
Edwards. Based upon the foregoing, we reject the finding of 
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the ALJ that Charging Party was in some manner prevented from 
attending his disciplinary hearing at the Step II level, since 
no disciplinary hearing relating to him was held on that date. 
The only remaining question that needs to be decided is 
whether Charging Party was improperly denied the opportunity 
to request a postponement of his hearing in order to obtain 
the services of an attorney, or whether Illery improperly 
failed to make such a request for him. As to this point. 
Illery testified, without contradiction, that he and Frank 
Scarpinato, Local 237 Secretary-Treasurer, had, at Local 237's 
office prior to the scheduling of the Step II hearing, 
informed Charging Party that, at least at the first two steps 
of the grievance procedure, an employee could not elect to be 
represented by an attorney, and that if he insisted upon 
obtaining one. Local 237 would not represent him further. 
Charging Party was accordingly on notice that he was not 
entitled to an attorney at Step II of the hearing procedure. 
In fact, Illery testified that, after he went into the hearing 
room on July 1 without Charging Party, a colloquy occurred, 
which he related as follows: 
Q. Did the Hearing Officer ask where Mr. Cantres 
was? 
A. Yes. He did. 
Q. What did you tell him? 
A. I told him he wanted to get his own attorney. 
Q. Did the Hearing Officer make a response to 
this do you recall? 
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A. He said. "Well does he know that the attorney 
cannot come into the hearing or the attorneys 
cannot represent him" or something to that 
effect, and I said, "We told him but he still 
wanted his own attorney," and he said, "OK". 
Judge Comenzo: You said that you told him that an 
attorney could not represent him? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Judge Comenzo: When was that? 
The Witness: When he was at the union office. 
In view of the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude 
that a request for a postponement in order for Charging Party 
to obtain private counsel, whether made by Illery or by 
Charging Party himself, would have been rejected by the 
hearing officer upon the ground that Charging Party was not 
entitled to attorney representation at Step II of the 
grievance procedure. 
There is, in any event, no record evidence of any 
likelihood that an adjournment of the Step II hearing would 
have been granted, if requested, in view of the prohibition 
against the use of attorneys at the second step of the 
3/ grievance procedure.— The Charging Party, therefore, 
failed to meet his burden of proving that his exclusion from 
the hearing room was improper, or that an adjournment to 
^/in fact, neither the charge nor the amended charge 
alleges that Local 237 violated the Act when it excluded 
Charging Party from the hearing room or when it failed to 
request, or afford him the opportunity to request, a 
postponement for the purpose of retaining private counsel, 
Board - U-8862 
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obtain private counsel would have been granted by the hearing 
officer if requested. A union is under no duty to perform 
4/ futile acts on behalf of its members.— 
The Charging Party was free, following his determination 
to obtain private counsel, to appeal the adverse second step 
determination to the third and then the fourth step of the 
grievance procedure, with the assistance of private counsel. 
However, there is no evidence that he either attempted to file 
such appeals himself, or by his attorney, nor is there any 
evidence that he requested Local 237 to do so. The final 
implementation of the penalty of termination took place, 
therefore, as a result of Charging Party's failure to proceed 
to the third and fourth steps of the grievance procedure, and 
not as a result of a failure to request a postponement of the 
second step hearing in order to obtain private counsel. We 
therefore reverse so much of the ALJ decision as finds that 
Illery's actions at the Step II level violated §209-a.2(a) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act. We do find. 
however, as did the ALJ. that the failure to investigate, 
communicate, and/or prepare for the Step I hearing violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act. However, finding, as we do, that the 
failure to properly process the disciplinary grievance at the 
first step of the procedure is not the proximate cause of 
^Elmira Teachers Association. 14 PERB 1f3047 (1981). 
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Charging Party's ultimate termination, the appropriate remedy 
is. of necessity, narrow in scope. In view of our finding 
that, despite the violation at Step I, the violation was not a 
proximate factor in the Charging Party's termination, we 
reject so much of the ALJ's recommended order as directs Local 
237 to seek a new hearing for Charging Party and offer to 
represent him. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that City Employees Union 
Local 237 appropriately investigate disciplinary cases for 
which it provides representation, that it communicate on a 
reasonably prompt basis with bargaining unit members seeking 
assistance, advice and information concerning their 
disciplinary cases, that it appropriately prepare such 
disciplinary cases for hearing, and that it post notice in the 
form attached at all locations ordinarily used by Local 237 
for written communications to unit employees. In all other 
respects, the charge is dismissed. 
DATED: August 6. 1987 
Albany, New York 
~&£J? '£<U6r7^-tZ. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City School District 
of the City of New York within the unit represented by City Employees Union 
Local 237 that City Employees Union Local 237 will: 
1. Appropriately investigate disciplinary cases for which it 
provides representation; 
2. Communicate on a reasonably prompt basis with bargaining unit 
members seeking assistance, advice and information concerning 
their disciplinary cases; and 
3. Appropriately prepare such disciplinary cases for hearing. 
City Employees Union Local 237 
Dated By 
(FUprwntative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. ^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PLAINVIEW-OLD BETHPAGE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3211 
SUBSTITUTE UNIT OF THE PLAINVIEW 
CONGRESS OF TEACHERS. NEA/NY. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Substitute Unit of the 
Plainview Congress of Teachers. NEA/NY has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who 
have a reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment as referred to in 
s201.7(d) of the Civil Service Law. 
Excluded: All other employees. - . - i 
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FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Substitute Unit of the 
Plainview Congress of Teachers, NEA/NY. To negotiate 
collectively is the performance of their mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, 
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 6, 1987 
Albany, New York 
"t&t/i^t^i^^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
*—• ^ v . > 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
"11113 
#3B-8/6/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF NEW HARTFORD. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-3214 
NEW HARTFORD POLICE OFFICER'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New Hartford Police 
Officer's Benevolent Association has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named employer, in 
the unit described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time employees 
in the following titles: sergeant, 
lieutenant and patrolman. 
Excluded: Chief of police, clerk (dispatcher) and 
all other employees. 
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FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New Hartford Police 
Officer's Benevolent Association. To negotiate collectively is 
the performance of their mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does 
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: August 6, 1987 
Albany, New York 
j/t^&Jl £ /b 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
x.r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF SULLIVAN. 
Employer, 
-^ and- CASE NO. C-3221 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 44 5. INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
SULLIVAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
WORKS SUPERVISORY UNIT. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 445, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
employer, in the unit described below, as their exclusive 
11116 
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representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All probationary, provisional and 
permanent employees in the Sullivan 
County Department of .Public Works 
Supervisory Unit as set forth in 
Appendix A. 
Excluded: All other employees 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 445, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. To negotiate 
collectively is the performance of their mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, 
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 6. 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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APPENDIX A 
Auto Shop Supervisor 
Civil Engineer 
Road Maintenance Supervisor 
General Construction Supervisor 
Sr. Civil Engineer 
Bridge Engineer 
Building Maintenance Supervisor 
Sign Shop Supervisor 
Custodial Supervisor 
Building Engineer 
Equipment Supervisor 
